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Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks
DAVID ZARING*
In this short essay, I address three current challenges to regulatory networks-the net-
works that, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has put it, exhibit "pattern[s] of regular and purpo-
sive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide
countries from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic' from the 'international'
sphere."'
The challenges are as follows. First, how should, can, and do these networks evolve?
Second, how can these networks be effective? And third, how have financial regulatory
networks such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)-two of the oldest and best established
networks directed at financial regulation-met the challenge of the 2008 global crisis in
finance?
I. Evolution
The evolution of regulatory networks may be charted by tracking the way the scholar-
ship on those networks has changed. In the early years of network analysis, schol-
ars-including myself -were impressed at how widespread and vibrant this tool of
international governance appeared to be.2 Networks were popping up everywhere, not
only in financial regulation, but also in transportation, antitrust, consumer protection, and
other areas where there were global spillovers and externalities, but no organized global
response. 3 The impulse was to count the number of institutions, marvel at their number,
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and note how different they were from traditional international law. And they were in-
deed different; the regulatory networks were created and operated by agencies and not by
heads of state, foreign ministers, and diplomats. And they had none of the formality of
traditional international legal instruments like treaties.
But as they evolved, networks have often adopted the trappings of traditional domestic
administrative law. Like domestic regulators, international networks that started out
sometimes in bars in Switzerland 4 among financial and other sorts of regulators of like
mind but with little attentiveness to procedures have evolved into something that increas-
ingly requires notice, comment, and opportunity to respond. A remarkable example of
this change lies in the contrast between the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy, which
was concluded in secret by the Basel Committee in 1988 and released in a twelve page
document, and the second one ("Basel II"), which was put through most of a decade's
worth of comment by hundreds of interested individuals and institutions and resulted in a
correspondingly long and detailed regulatory product.6 IOSCO has similarly opened its
deliberations to this sort of ventilation by interested and affected parties; so have other
networks. The resulting process in these cases is one that would be familiar to American
lawyers accustomed to domestic rule-making.
Domestic regulation and international networks have also converged in their procedural
affection for best practices in lieu of rules. In a classic best practices scheme, regulated
entities themselves devise practices to comply with relatively unspecific regulatory re-
quirements. These practices are selected and publicized as "best," but not mandated, by a
loosely coordinated central regulatory body.7 The idea is that these best practices will
subsequently be adopted by other regulated entities. Best practices are tailor-made for the
rather small secretariats and nonbinding nature of international regulation, although they
are increasingly popular in domestic law as well. 8
The result is that regulatory networks have become fully formed alternatives to the new
international tribunals that increasingly meant to give form and content to international
legal regimes. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court are examples of the turn to tribunals as a way to bolster and
strengthen international governance. As networks have evolved to look like domestic
rule-makers, they offer a different way to bolster and strengthen international governance.
The idea, familiar to scholars of domestic administrative law, is that networks are increas-
ingly playing the role of international rule-makers, while tribunals play the role of interna-
Abroad: The FAA's Aircraft Certification Experience, 24 LAW & POL'v IN-T'L Bus. 669, 774 (1993) (discussing
aircraft certification harmonization). And of course this list is a very partial one.
4. Janet Koven Levitt, Speech at the SMU Rise of Transnational Networks Symposium: Transnational
Networks and International Cooperation: Contributions and Challenges for Trade Finance (Nov. 7, 2008)
(describing the origins of the trade finance network).
5. See International Law, supra note 2, for a discussion of the early procedural informality of these
networks.
6. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 Cm. J. INT'L L. 547,
572-80 (2005).
7. See generally David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294 (2006).
8. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 455
(2003). See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 1.
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tional adjudicators, with the result being an increasingly elaborate form of global
administrative law. 9
II. Effectiveness
One of the testaments to the effectiveness of the Basel Committee lies in the blame that
is being laid at the feet of its second capital accord for the current financial crisis. The
first financial institutions to fail in the crisis were, at least in the view of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, adequately capitalized under Basel II up to the moment they
failed. This was the case for both Bear Stearns,' 0 which collapsed in the spring of 2008,
and Lehman Brothers," which fell that summer. There is no question that the Basel II
will be reevaluated sooner rather than later, but perhaps one lesson of the crisis is not that
a regulatory network failed, but rather that a regulatory network made a difference; it was
the Basel Committee that set the standards that Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the
big European banks met in practice, and it was Basel 11 that did not, in the end, suffi-
ciently keep the banks solvent.
By comparison, IOSCO has a very different record of success, at least success, as de-
fined here, as actually affecting its regulated industry. Securities cooperation through
IOSCO has happened on enforcement-the organization touts its multilateral Memoran-
dum of Understanding as a chief achievement, and that memorandum is concerned with
law enforcement cooperation. But the organization has failed to promulgate or even facil-
itate global accounting standards, although it did make efforts along those lines in the
1990s. 12 Ultimately, the job for developing international accounting rules was left to the
International Accounting Standards Board, which developed International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS), with IOSCO playing only an observer role in the process. 13
Nor has IOSCO promulgated capitalization requirements for broker dealers that might
have kept Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers afloat. Especially in light of the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, it is fair to say that the United States and Europe have failed to
harmonize their securities regimes. In fact, large differences between the listing require-
ments in American and European, particularly British, markets remain to this day. These
differences have led to an increasing amount of forum shopping by market participants, as
shown by Chris Brummer. 14
The difference between the successes of the international banking regulatory enterprise
and the more limited victories for international securities governance are particularly in-
teresting because they look like a good, albeit not particularly rigorous, natural experi-
ment that could test the regulatory network form. Banking regulators and securities
9. See David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563
(2008) [hereinafter Ruleonaking].
10. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Chairman Cox Letter to Basel Committee in Support of New
Guidance on Liquidity Management (Mar. 20,2008), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
48.htm.
11. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement Regarding Recent Market Events and Lehman
Brothers (Sept. 14, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-197.htm.
12. See Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 584.
13. Id.
14. See Chris Brummer, Stock Excbanges and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75 U. CI. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=1014683.
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regulators have similar incentives. In both fields, there has been the same kind of global-
ization of finance that makes the case. for global solutions. Both banking and securities
regulators have been confronted by the externalities that can result when a heavily inter-
nationalized bank or an investment firm with exposure abroad look adequately capitalized
in some jurisdictions, but not on a global basis. Moreover, the domestic regulators con-
fronted with these problems are experienced and well-institutionalized, especially in the
United States and Europe, and would seem to be capable of responding to the new chal-
lenges of globalization.
In other words, there is no obvious reason why there should have been effective net-
work harmonization and global creation of rules in the banking industry and not one, at
least not one so far, in securities regulation. What explains the difference between what
has happened in banking and what has happened in securities?
One way to predict whether a network will become effective, as opposed to an interna-
tional talking shop, is to consider what stage of regulatory harmonization it has reached.
Regulatory networks-as was the case with both IOSCO and the Basel Committee-begin
with agreements to exchange information, often with an eye to assisting the members of
the network in their domestic enforcement responsibilities. That initial stage of informa-
tion exchange and memoranda of understandings for enforcement cooperation is only a
first step in harmonization because it is a step that allows these regulators to solve
problems of internationalization yet also retain their unique domestic approaches to
regulation.
Very commonly, regulatory networks next move from information-sharing agreements
to promulgating the principles of regulation that provide baselines that every domestic
member of the network is supposed to meet. These principles are shorter than the sort of
rules that form the basis of domestic financial regulation and tend to contain gauzy princi-
ples that most sophisticated regulators assume they have long met. Indeed, in financial
regulation, few networks have failed to move from cooperation and the sharing of infor-
mation to these sorts of statements of general regulatory principles.
The challenging step for networks is the next step-the move from principles to rules. It
is a step that the Basel Committee has taken and that IOSCO has not.
Why is there a difference in what happened between the two? One difference between
Basel and IOSCO lies in the way these networks are organized. One is exclusive, and one
is much less so; the Basel Committee was until 2009 composed of the same twelve central
bankers who founded it.15 The Basel Committee has not expanded its membership to
include different parts of the world, the "BRIC" countries, 16 or other developing markets.
Moreover, although the Basel Committee has taken some real steps towards transparency,
it still meets in secret.
IOSCO has taken a very different approach, opening up membership to all securities
regulators; the organization can claim 191 members. 17 To be sure, it has divided up that
membership into a Technical Committee that focuses on the supervision of established
15. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee and its Membership,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
16. That is, Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
17. See IOSCO, IOSCO Membership and Committees Lists, http://www.iosco.org/lists/index.cfm?sec-
tion=general (follow "Ordinary" or "Associate" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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markets and other committees focused on emerging markets. But it could be that the
exclusivity that Basel enjoys and that IOSCO does not, even at the cost of transparency
and other facets of administrative good governance, is making a difference.
The result-as Chris Brummer has explained in the regional context and is positing
more generally in forthcoming work-is that outfits like the Basel Committee have been
able to create a regime that offers more than club goods and like advantages to member-
ship, but that also offers real costs of exit.' 8 It is, at this point, difficult for a central bank
to conceive of leaving the Basel Capital Accord Regime, and none ever has, although
sometimes members have exhibited less than perfect compliance with the capital accords.
The creation of costs of exit is something that the banking supervisors have been able to
achieve and that IOSCO has not done with its core principles and information exchange
requirements, which require international interaction, but which do not impose harmoni-
zation mandates. Brummer suggests that the difference here looks like the difference be-
tween a social network and an economic network-the difference between, say, friendship
and a telephone monopoly. 19 That insight nicely brings the study of networks back to the
social scientists who first theorized about them and that prompted lawyers to develop their
persuasive theories about how international regulation really works.
IIl. Can Networks Pass the Test of a Financial Crisis?
Neither IOSCO nor the Basel Committee yet dominates its sphere of international
financial regulation, as their roles in the 2008 financial crisis suggests. During that crisis,
the Securities and Exchange Commission implemented a short-lived ban on the shorting
of financial stocks. It coordinated that ban with the securities regimes of other countries,
including Great Britain, Australia, Taiwan, and Pakistan.2 0 But IOSCO was not the vehi-
cle for the short ban, and, indeed, the organization has had little to say about the financial
crisis in any respect, other than a May, 2008 suggestion that its members peruse some
recommendations about the subprime mortgage crisis, the precursor to the market
crashes. 21
As for the Basel Committee, the efforts to solve the increasing internationalization of
the banking crisis is something that has not sent every central banker to Switzerland, at
least not as far as we know-the committee operates in secret. It, like JOSCO, has so far
responded to the crisis with small beer, such as a speech on The Importance of Banking
Supervision in Financial Stability.22
18. Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade Perspective, 8 CH. J. INT'L L.
535 (2008).
19. Id.; for a discussion of network theory, as applied to legal analysis, see Mark A. Lemley & David Mc-
Gowan, Legal Implications Of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 489-90, 492-93 (1998).
20. See, e.g., Canadian Regulators Implement Short-Selling Ban, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUSN1925996220080919.
21. IOSCO Technical Comm.of the Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'n, Final Report on the Subprime Crisis (May
2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf.
22. Nout Wellink, President, Netherlands Bank, & Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Key-
note Address at the FSI-EMFAP High Level Meeting on Bank Supervision: The Importance of Banking
Supervision in Financial Stability, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.bis.org/review/r08ll17a.pdf [Here-
inafter Wellink Address]. To be fair, Basel also promulgated some supervisory principles, albeit rather un-
specific ones, designed to deal with liquidity risk. See Press Release, Basel Committee, Global Bank
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Instead, the initial vehicles of a coordinated international response to the banking crisis
have come from the G20,23 and its predecessor the G724, which are informal but regular
meetings of the premiers of selected wealthy countries, generally on the subject of the
global economy. Although financial regulators appear to do much of the underlying work
in preparation for these meetings, the G20 is not their organization, but rather one
headed by heads of state. And the coordinated injections of funds into the monetary sup-
ply by the central banks-their coordinated approach on monetary policy-is not obvi-
ously linked to the network that has helped them coordinate supervisory policy. 25 Like
IOSCO, the Basel Committee's publicly available regulatory production during the crisis
has veered towards the anodyne statement, rather than to the substantive response.26
It is too soon for a final judgment, but it does appear that at the beginning of the
financial crisis, regulators and governments did not conclude that the regulatory networks
that have grown and evolved in response to prior crises were the right institutions for the
coordination of responses in 2008. Does the reaction to the financial crisis suggest that
these networks are not the answer to the problems of global governance?
That conclusion, I think, would be premature, but the defense of IOSCO and the Basel
Committee turns on admittedly less quantifiable contributions. Both organizations were
founded in 1974, and it is possible that over three decades cooperation among central
bankers and securities regulators has contributed to the capacity for the coordinated re-
sponse that we have seen, to the degree that we have seen it. It may be (indeed it is
rumored to be so), for example, that the SEC coordinated its shorting ban with its inter-
national counterparts at an IOSCO meeting, even though the coordination was done in
the hallways rather than during the official session. And it could be that the coordination
of the coordinated injections of capital by the world's central bankers was facilitated by
their already extant supervisory cooperation. Perhaps, in other words, regulatory net-
Supervisors Endorse Strengthened Sound Practice Standards for Liquidity Risk Management and Supervi-
sion, (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/press/pO80925.htm [hereinafter Basel Release].
23. The G20 meeting on November 15, 2008 addressed a number of issues, including banking and securi-
ties market supervision. The text of the agreement contains a number of proposals on the harmonization of
financial market supervision, although, to be sure, they focus more on principles than on the sort of hard rules
with which the Basel Committee has found success:
We pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and
ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as
appropriate to their circumstances. We will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies,
consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of conduct. We will also make
regulatory regimes more effective over the economic cycle, while ensuring that regulation is effi-
cient, does not stifle innovation, and encourages expanded trade in financial products and ser-
vices. Ve commit to transparent assessments of our national regulatory systems.
Statement From G-20 Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, available at http://www.nytiines.coin/2008/11/16/
washington/summit-text.html?pagewanted=3.
24. Mark Landler, Rich Nations Pushing for Joint Financial Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at Al, available
at http://www.nvtimes.com/2008/1 0/11/business/l lglobal.html?parmer=rssnyt.
25. Matthew Salnarsh & Keith Bradsher, Fed Offers $180 Billion for Ailing Money Markets, N.Y. TIES,
Sept. 18, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/business/worldbusiness/19centbank.
html?scp= l &sq=central%20banks%20equity%20international%20coordinated&st=cse.
26. See Wellink Address, svpra note 22. On the other hand, the committee has become one of the early
movers in the reform of the international capital adequacy regime, in light of the credit crisis. For a discus-
sion, see Posting of David Zaring, Will the Basel Committee Solve the Financial Crisis? (Nov. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/1 1/will-the-basel.html.
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works created the relationships that have facilitated the international responses to the
crisis.
Proving a connection between response and network will not be easy, even with the
benefit of hindsight. Perhaps aficionados of regulatory networks should consider the early
development of the crisis to be evidence that networks will not necessarily take the lead in
responding to shocks (though they may play an important role in the aftermath of shocks),
but there is no need to dismiss their work entirely, even if it makes a secondary, rather
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